POLITICAL EMBEDDEDNESS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF EMOTIONS

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Abstract

This paper explores how variation in political embeddedness of social movement organizations (SMOs) influences the management of emotions. By variation in political embeddedness of SMOs, we mean variation in the strength and the number of ties between SMOs and the political establishment. By management of emotions, we mean efforts of SMO leaders to evoke particular emotions among SMO members. Using data from protest surveys conducted at demonstrations regarding climate change in Belgium and the Netherlands in 2009, we find that protestors who are members of a politically more embedded SMO are generally less angry than protestors who are members of a politically less embedded SMO. The finding that this pattern is especially strong among SMO members who heard about the demonstration through an SMO, confirms the assumed role of SMO leaders in the management of emotions.
The political embeddedness of social movement organizations (SMOs), understood as a combination of the strength and the number of ties between SMOs and the political establishment, has figured prominently in classical theories on the activity and evolution of SMOs (e.g. McAdam 1982; Michels 1911; Piven and Cloward 1977; Zald and Ash 1966). These theories propose that higher degrees of political embeddedness of SMOs decrease the incentive of movement organizers to mobilize their members and resort to unconventional tactics (Michels 1911; Piven and Cloward 1977). Conversely, lower levels of political embeddedness increase the incentives of movement organizers to mobilize their members and resort to unconventional tactics.

Evidence for the assumed correlation between political embeddedness of SMOs on the one hand and mobilization and resort to unconventional tactics on the other hand has come in various forms. Scholars have resorted to measures such as turnout numbers for specific protests, frequency of protest actions, and variation in non-conventional action (e.g. McAdam 1982; Piven and Cloward 1977).

Both theory and empirical evidence for the correlation between political embeddedness of SMOs on the one hand and mobilization and resort to unconventional tactics on the other hand operate primarily at the macro- and meso-level. Crucially, they neglect to study the micro-level, i.e. how political embeddedness of particular SMOs influences beliefs, attitudes, motivations and emotions related to unconventional tactics of individual SMO members.

In this paper, we focus on one dimension of the micro-level, namely the emotional orientation of SMO members. Emotions are an under-explored domain in
social movement scholarship (Jasper 2011). Yet SM scholars have rightfully argued that emotions are highly relevant for understanding mobilization processes.

Different emotions, including anger, shame, fear, frustration and pleasure are pertinent to mobilization (e.g. Goodwin and Pfaff 2001; Gould 2009; Robnett 2004). We concentrate in this paper on anger. Anger is, arguably, the most widely discussed emotion in mobilization research (Jasper 2011). Consequently, concentrating on anger allows us to formulate and test relatively clear hypotheses.

In our paper, we shall show that members of politically more embedded display lower levels of anger than members of politically less embedded SMOs. Following studies on emotion management and emotion work, we hypothesize that organizers of SMOs that are politically less embedded are more inclined to evoke anger. We shall refer to this mechanism as the “emotion management” mechanism.

The assumption that movement organizers and activists try to appeal to feelings of anger or moral outrage is not new. In a review of social movement literature on emotions, Goodwin and Jasper wrote: “The prospect of unexpected and sudden changes in one’s surroundings can arouse feelings of dread and anger. The former can paralyze, but the latter can become the basis of mobilization. Activists work hard to create moral outrage and anger and to suggest targets against which they can be vented.” (2006: 620, emphasis added)

Our contribution to previous work on emotion management in social movements is twofold. First, we argue that while some movement organizers appeal to feelings of anger; not all do. Given that some but not all organizers appeal to feelings of anger, the
question arises which organizers appeal to feelings of anger and which do not. We suggest that variation in political embeddedness is an important cause for variation in organizers’ appeal to anger. Second, we investigate emotions of social movement members. Most work on ‘emotion management’ in social movement research focuses on organizers, neglecting systematic analysis of the movement base and the process by which that base does, or does not, get emotionally affected.

We test our argument with data from surveys distributed among participants in climate change demonstrations in Belgium and the Netherlands in 2009. The demonstrations took place in similar issue-specific political contexts, yet the first demonstration was far less routinized than the second. Within each demonstration, we selected protest participants of two SMOs that vary considerably in terms of political embeddedness. We asked respondents amongst others about organizational membership and their self-reported level of anger.

This paper consists of four parts. In Part 1, we outline our theoretical framework. We summarize past research and present our hypotheses. In Part 2, we present our research design. We account for our case selection and discuss how our selected SMOs vary in terms of political embeddedness. In Part 3, we put forth our analysis. We present descriptive statistics, graphs and inferential statistics (ordered logistic regression output) for the hypothesized correlation between political embeddedness and anger, as well as its supporting emotion management mechanism. In this section, we answer the question: Does the level of political embeddedness of SMOs influence emotion management by
SMO organizers, and if so, how do we observe it at the micro-level? In Part 4, we discuss our findings and suggest avenues for future research.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Political Embeddedness

The term political embeddedness itself is hardly used in writings on relations between SMOs and the political establishment, although these relations have been widely discussed in theories around increasing or diminishing levels of mobilization or confrontational politics (e.g. McAdam 1982; Michels 1911; Piven and Cloward 1977; Zald and Ash 1966).

Analyses of the effect of political embeddedness on mobilization and confrontational politics originally developed in the context of resource mobilization theory (RMT). RMT emphasizes the role of resources in the emergence, maintenance and decline of SMOs (Zald and Ash 1966). SMO leaders demand resources – financial and other – for the mobilization of citizens and the organization of activities. These resources could come from outside the organization, including from institutions such as the church, charitable foundations and the state (see e.g. McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Jenkins 1983: 533).

Attempts to generate resources from outside the organization come at a price, however: in order to secure funding over time, SMO leaders are often forced – explicitly or implicitly – to choose conventional instead of radical goals and strategies (see e.g. McAdam 1982; McCarthy, Britt and Wolfson 1991; Piven and Cloward 1977). Hence,
not all SMO leaders choose the path of increasing and strengthening ties to the political establishment. Some, such as the leaders of Greenpeace, deliberately decide to remain distant from the political establishment. The ability of leaders to amass resources from outside, and become politically more embedded in the process, has typically been dependent on professionalization of SMOs. By professionalization, we mean the recruitment of professional managers and the bureaucratic administration of organizational affairs. Professional managers and bureaucratic administration signal efficiency of an organization. Such efficiency is appealing and often critical to outside funders.

The conditionality of outside funding and political embeddedness on professionalization does not mean that professionalization always correlates with political embeddedness. Some SMOs are professionally organized but decide to refrain from establishing ties to the political establishment (Staggenborg 1988). In general, we thus see that there is no political embeddedness without professionalization, but there can be professionalization without political embeddedness (see also Clemens and Minkoff 2007: 156).

Resource mobilization theory (RMT) is not the only theoretical paradigm that has addressed relations between SMOs and the political establishment. Scholars working on political process also investigated these relations. However, the angle of political process and RMT is somewhat different. RMT scholars have focused on decision making of SMO leaders. RMT scholars have examined why and how SMO leaders accrue resources to mobilize citizens. The emphasis among RMT scholars is on dynamics within
organizations (see also Jenkins 1983). Scholars working from within the political process paradigm pay more attention to actors in the political establishment. These scholars have, amongst others, asked how political actors ‘co-opt’ SMO leaders and, in the process, pacify or conversely enable SMOs (McAdam 1982; Kriesi, Koopmas, Duyvendak and Giugni 1995). Both paradigms – resource mobilization and political process – thus address the effect of political embeddedness of SMOs on mobilization, but they concentrate on different actors or dimensions: RMT focuses on SMO leaders, and political process theory on political leaders.

*Emotion Management*

Building on, and extending, past research on political embeddedness of SMOs, we expect that SMOs with lower levels of political embeddedness will more likely appeal to or stimulate anger on the side of SMO members. Our assumptions regarding the stimulation of anger and emotions more generally relate to research on emotion management (Hochschild 1983) or emotional mobilization (Goodwin and Pfaff 2001).[^4] “[E]motion mobilization refers to processes through which feelings are suppressed, evoked, and used in multiple contexts so as to foster and/or support activism” (Schrock, Holden and Reid 2004: 62). We expect social movement leaders to strategically manage the emotions of their members around protest events.

Emotion management in the context of SMOs is founded on four assumptions. First, in line with RMT research, we hold that leaders of SMOs are rational and
calculating actors (Jenkins 1983: 528), meaning that they often, but not always, weigh costs and benefits before arriving at decisions on SMO strategies.

Second, leaders of SMOs that are politically less embedded have an interest in mobilization and use of unconventional tactics. These leaders have, amongst others, less access to politics and hence a tendency to resort to unconventional methods to influence politics. These politically less embedded SMOs are generally more radical in nature (Piven and Cloward 1977; see also Giugni and Passy 1998: 91). Leaders of SMOs that are politically more embedded will be less interested in the use of unconventional tactics.

Third, anger of SMO members facilitates mobilization and engagement in unconventional tactics. It builds up the energy that is needed for collective action (Hercus 1999: 36). Kim explains: “[E]motions provide a commitment mechanism through which apathetic bystanders develop new activist interest and movement activists sustain and invigorate their activism.” (2002: 161)

Fourth, leaders of SMOs understand that anger facilitates mobilization and engagement in unconventional action (Gould 2009). Organizers of SMOs that are politically less embedded are therefore likely to produce and emit more radical and confrontational frames and signals. By contrast, organizers of SMOs that are politically more embedded are likely to produce and emit less radical and confrontational frames and signals. These frames and signals from respective organizations can influence the way that members feel about particular issues. For such transformative influence to occur, it is essential that members actually receive messages containing those frames.
Working Hypotheses

Based on the combination of past research on political embeddedness and our four assumptions on emotion management in the context of SMOs we present two working hypotheses. First, we expect that members of SMOs with lower levels of political embeddedness will on average display a higher intensity of anger. Second, we expect that the effect of political embeddedness on anger will be especially strong – an interaction term in statistical language – among those members who receive, as opposed to those who do not receive, frames and signals from their organization.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Our research design follows the logic of “theory testing case studies” (George and Bennett 2004: 75). Corresponding to this logic, we present a theory that has not yet been tested, and select a set of ideal cases that should, if our theory is indeed true, demonstrate significant effects. By ideal cases, we mean cases that vary manifestly on the dimension of interest but demonstrate similarity on other dimensions that could explain variation on the dependent variable. In the context of this study, the dimension of interest is the level of political embeddedness of an SMO. The dependent variable is self-reported level of anger among protest participants.

In order to test our theory, we use survey data from demonstrations in Belgium and the Netherlands. These demonstrations revolved around the same issue, and took part around the same time in two countries that border one another in Northwest Europe.
Belgium and the Netherlands are similar in issue-specific political context. Both countries have a parliamentary system, proportional representation in parliament, multi-party government coalitions, and a bicameral legislature. Both countries had green parties; two in Belgium and one in the Netherlands. Table 1 and Table 2 present the distribution of electoral votes and parliamentary seats, between 1998 and 2008, for the Belgian green parties (combined) and the Dutch green party respectively.

**TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE**

**TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE**

Despite similarities in issue-specific political contexts, the demonstration in Belgium was six times as large, less routinized and more confrontational than the demonstration in the Netherlands.

*Data Collection*

We collected four types of data to address our research question. Our first and primary source of data emerged from surveys distributed among participants during the demonstrations in Belgium and the Netherlands. This data was collected in light of a larger project called ‘Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation’ (see van Stekelenburg et al. in this issue).
Our second source of data comes from structured interviews with representatives of SMO organizers. Research assistants affiliated with the project ‘Caught in the Act of Protest’ have conducted these interviews before and after each demonstration.

Our third source of data is based on semi-structured interviews with representatives of selected SMOs. The first author carried out these interviews to attain a more detailed understanding of the background against which the demonstrations had taken place.

Our fourth and final source of data regards a test on the interpretation of frames. We hypothesize, in this paper, that the reception of more radical frames by SMO organizers generates higher levels of anger of SMO members. In order to test this hypothesis, we had to make sure that frames that we classified as more or less radical were also interpreted as such by outsiders. We conducted a small test to ensure concurrence in interpretation.

We elaborate on each type of data as we proceed through our analysis.

The Demonstrations

The two demonstrations took place in December 2009, shortly before the UN Climate Change Conference. During the conference, often referred to as the Copenhagen summit, world leaders met to negotiate an agreement for the emission of carbon dioxide and find ways to reduce climate change. Worldwide many demonstrations were organized in light of the summit.
The first demonstration took place in Brussels (Belgium), on December 5, 2009. Approximately 15,000 individuals participated in Belgium. The second demonstration was in Utrecht (the Netherlands), on December 12, 2009. Approximately 2,500 individuals participated in the Netherlands. Both demonstrations were organized by a coalition of SMOs. In Belgium and the Netherlands, SMOs joined together in the ‘Climate Coalition’ and the ‘Kopenhagencoalitie’ (Copenhagen Coalition) respectively.

In Belgium, more than seventy organizations were part of the Climate Coalition, including environmental organizations, unions and global justice organizations. The Climate Coalition had organized two demonstrations prior to the 2009 protest. The first demonstration took place in 2007 and the second in 2008. For the 2007 demonstration, the organizers of the Climate Coalition had aimed at sending a strong signal to politics that “something had to be done about climate change”. In 2008, the coalition partners tried to produce a memorandum including a “clear message” about what exactly had to be done. The failure among coalition partners to reach agreement on that message caused internal friction and a very low turnout for the 2008 demonstration. The leaders of the Climate Coalition decided to return to a looser call for action. Yet, many efforts were made to mobilize the movement base. A large dance parade, ‘Dance for the Climate’, was organized in August of 2009. Many celebrities called for climate change awareness in the media in the months and weeks leading up to the Brussels demonstration in December 2009.

In the Netherlands, environmental and global justice organizations also joined forces to stage an event before the Copenhagen summit. Contrary to their Belgian
colleagues, the Dutch organizers did not have a history of climate change demonstrations prior to 2009. The organizers framed the event as a “manifestation” and called the event ‘Beat the Heat Now’. They had successfully called upon some well-known artists to perform at the manifestation that was held inside a large convention hall. The University of Utrecht was the first mover and remained a principal leader. But there were twelve environmental and social justice organizations involved in staging the event. Moreover, about twenty other organizations supported the event. Campaigning for the event already started in August 2009, with radio commercials and announcements on billboards across the country. The city council of Utrecht and the National Railway had significantly contributed – materially and financially – towards the organization of the event. ‘Beat the Heat Now’ took place at night, between 4.30pm and 10pm. Individuals had to acquire a ticket to attend the event. At the end of the manifestation, a train with politicians, bureaucrats, scientists and journalists left for Copenhagen. Individuals could leave a message for politicians on the train. Organizers referred to the train as the ‘Beat the Heat Express’, the “longest driving petition”.  

*Case selection at the SMO-level*

In order to test our theoretical argument we selected one politically less embedded SMO (Greenpeace in Belgium and Greenpeace in the Netherlands) and one politically more embedded SMO (Natuurpunt/Natagora in Belgium, and Natuurmonumenten in the Netherlands) for each demonstration (see Table 3). Natuurmonumenten, Natuurpunt and Natagora are very similar in terms of the core issues of interest and their approach to
politics. Hereafter, we will refer to Natuurmonumenten and Natuurpunt/Natagora as ‘Natuurpunt’.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

In terms of issues, Greenpeace focuses chiefly on nuclear energy, nature and the preservation of wildlife. Natuurpunt presents a primary interest in nature conservation and nature education. Climate change was, before the late nineties, not a core concern of either one of the four organizations. Increasing attention from within the international community in the late nineties led all four organizations to increase their attention to climate change. But overall, climate change is still not their main concern.

Greenpeace is a politically less embedded SMO. Greenpeace explicitly shuns funding from the government. Natuurpunt, by contrast, heavily depends on government funding. Greenpeace occasionally resorts to radical action. Natuurpunt generally rejects radical action; it tries to promote its cases through constant dialogue with the political establishment. All organizations are professional with a paid staff and bureaucratic administration.

We assessed the ‘perceived political embeddedness’ of three of the four selected SMOs through a question that research assistants of the project ‘Caught in the Act of Protest’ presented to SMO representatives. The question that we posed was the following.

Please tell us which ONE of the following statements best describes your organization:
a. The government frequently seeks the advice of our organization
b. The government is friendly to our organization, but our organization initiates most contact
c. The government sometimes receives our organization with hostility and at other times is welcome depending on the issue/s or departments involved
d. The government never listens to our organization although our organization does try to influence them
e. Our organization prefers to campaign in other ways

Responses from the SMOs confirmed our estimates. Greenpeace Belgium indicated that “the government sometimes receives our organization with hostility and other times is welcoming depending on the issue/s or departments involved” (answer c). Greenpeace Netherlands reported: “The government/council is friendly to our organization, but our organization initiates most contact.” (answer b). And finally, both the representative from Natuurmonumenten and from Natuurpunt said: “The government/council frequently seeks the advice of our organization” (answer a).

The above responses suggest that organizers of Greenpeace, the objectively politically less embedded SMO, also perceived their organization to be politically less embedded than organizers of Natuurpunt, the objectively politically more embedded SMO, both in Belgium and in the Netherlands. Accordingly, we expected and found (see under ‘Emotion Management Mechanism below) that organizers of Greenpeace transmit more confrontational frames as compared to organizers of Natuurpunt.
ANALYSIS

One thousand questionnaires were distributed at each demonstration in Utrecht and Brussels, we distributed one thousand surveys each. The return rate was 34 percent in Brussels (Belgium) and 27 percent for Utrecht (Netherlands). The Belgian and Dutch respondents were quite similar in terms of age and education, but somewhat different in terms of gender. The average age of all respondents in Belgium was 44 (SD=14) years. The average age of all respondents in the Netherlands was also 44 (SD=15) years. In terms of education, 44 percent of all Belgian respondents had enjoyed post-secondary education; 47 percent of all Dutch respondents had enjoyed post-secondary education. In Belgium, 45 percent of all respondents was female; in the Netherlands, 60 percent was female.

The above statistics suggest that as far as age and education are concerned the composition of respondents in Belgium and the Netherlands was quite similar. We nonetheless controlled for these properties in our logistic regressions and found that none of them significantly influenced the dependent variables.

Selected Respondents

In order to identify membership of one of the previously discussed SMOs – Natuurpunt or Greenpeace – we used the following open-ended questions. “Could you list the main organizations that staged this demonstration/manifestation? Are you a member of one of these organizations? If so, what is/are the name/names of this/these organizations?”
We first selected individuals who identified as members of an environmental organization. We then selected members of either Natuurpunt or Greenpeace (see bold numbers in Table 4). Some individuals indicated that they were members of both Natuurpunt and Greenpeace (third row, Table 4). We excluded these individuals from our analysis in this paper.\textsuperscript{14}

**TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE**

*Correlation between Political Embeddedness of SMOs and Anger of Their Members*

We started our analysis by looking at the correlation between the political embeddedness of SMOs and the self-reported level of anger of their members. We employed the following statement for the estimation of the dependent variable: “Thinking about climate change, I feel angry”. Respondents could score on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 meant “not at all” and 5 meant “very”.

In Figure 1, we present mean scores on self-reported level of anger of members of politically more or less embedded SMOs, both for the more and the less routinized demonstration. The scores in the table are generally high.\textsuperscript{15} Despite these expected high scores for individuals who come to a demonstration, we find systematic variation in the self-reported level of anger across groups.

**FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE**
In both demonstrations, we observe that members of Greenpeace – the politically less embedded SMO – score on average higher on the level of self-reported anger than members of Natuurpunt. This coincides with our initial hypothesis.

In order to determine whether these differences are statistically significant, we conducted an ordered logistic regression. Given the one-directional nature of our hypotheses, we applied one-tailed tests for our regression analyses.

We generated a variable “SMO Political Embeddedness” to indicate membership of an organization that is politically less embedded (Greenpeace) or politically more embedded (Natuurpunt). Respondents in our sample who reported membership of Greenpeace scored 0 on this variable. Respondents in our sample who reported membership of Natuurpunt scored 1 on this variable. We included a country variable. Respondents in our sample from Belgium scored 0 on this variable. Respondents in our sample from the Netherlands scored 1 on this variable. We included an interaction term between country and political embeddedness to check whether the effect of political embeddedness was different in Belgium and the Netherlands. We coded education using the “International Standard Classification of Education” (ISCED). We included the variables “Age Squared” and “Education Squared” to control for non-linear effects. We measured political orientation by asking respondents to report their political orientation on an 11-point continuum from left to right.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
The results for the baseline model (see Table 5) demonstrate that the effect of political embeddedness on anger is statistically significant \((p = 0.01)\) in a one-tailed test. The coefficient is negative, pointing into the direction that we hypothesized: a politically more embedded SMO (Natuurpunt) will have less angry members, while a politically less embedded SMO (Greenpeace) will have angrier members.

Our findings reveal that participants in the less routinized demonstration in Belgium were, on average, angrier than participants in the more routinized demonstration in the Netherlands. But among those angrier protest participants in Belgium and among the less angry protest participants in the Netherlands, we find variation. In both cases, members of Greenpeace (politically less embedded SMO) were angrier than members of Natuurpunt (politically more embedded SMO).

We tested for an interaction between political embeddedness of an SMO and the country in which the demonstration took place. We found no statistically significant effects for the interaction term \((p = 0.21)\) in a one-tailed test, even after centering the interaction term. Given the relatively low number of observations, we decided to omit the interaction term in further analyses.

We find that “Education” and “Education squared” are statistically significant \((p = 0.03\) and \(p = 0.03\) respectively). The statistical significance of “Education squared” and the negative sign of its coefficient suggest that respondents with low levels of education and respondents with high levels of education have lower self-reported levels of anger than respondents with average level education.
Emotion Management Mechanism

In order to test the emotion management mechanism – organizers evoke emotions among their members – we focus on communication. We distinguish between individual members who heard about the demonstration through their organization, and those who did not. We used the following survey question: “How did you learn about this demonstration/manifestation: through….” Respondents would see a list of information channels including “through an organization (magazine, meeting, website, mailing list”).

The assumption underlying the emotion management mechanism is that differently politically embedded SMOs send out distinct frames and signal diverse positions on their relations to the political establishment. To verify that assumption, we compared information about climate change and politics on the websites of Greenpeace and Natuurpunt. We found that Natuurpunt (both in Belgium and in the Netherlands) was primarily ‘informative’ about climate change, explaining mechanisms of climate change and the ways in which nature conservation could help minimize climate change. Greenpeace presented itself in a rather confrontational manner. Greenpeace Netherlands speaks of an ‘energy revolution’ that needs to be realized; politicians should drastically change existing policies according to the organization. Greenpeace Belgium writes: “The answer to climate change should come from politics.” Natuurpunt, by contrast, does not speak out against politics, emphasizing dialogue rather than confrontational action.

In order to check whether the difference in frames and signals that we observed between Greenpeace and Natuurpunt is also interpreted as such by outsiders, we conducted a small test, in which we asked ten individuals who are unrelated to this
project to compare statements from the two organizations’ website, policy reports, etc. around the following five issues: (1) state of the climate, (2) causes of climate change, (3) consequences of climate change, (4) position towards politics, and (5) activities of organization to address climate change. For each issue, we paired one statement from Greenpeace with one from Natuurpunt. Out of the 50 responses that we received 49 responses identified a statement from Greenpeace indeed as more radical or confrontational, and a statement from Natuurpunt as less radical or confrontational.

We coded the variable 0 if a respondent did not hear about the upcoming event through an organization. We coded the variable 1 if a respondent did hear about the upcoming event through an organization. In order to test whether the effect of communication was different for SMOs that are politically more or less embedded, we generated an interaction term. We expected that respondents who were members of a politically less embedded SMO (Greenpeace) and who heard about the demonstration through an organization would on average be angrier than members who had not heard about the demonstration through an organization.

The regression output for our second model – the emotion management mechanism (see Table 3) – indicates that the statistical significance of SMO political embeddedness remained fairly stable; the p-value was .02 in a one-tailed test. Furthermore, we observe that communication, i.e. whether or not an individual had received information through his or her organization, generates statistically significant effects ($p= 0.04$, in a one-tailed test). Put differently, we find evidence in support of our emotion mechanism.
In order to assess the strength or weakness of the interaction term more in depth, we compared mean scores on ‘self-reported level of anger’ for all four group that the interaction term represents. Results are reported for Belgium in Figure 2, and the Netherlands in Figure 3.

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

In Belgium, we observe that the slopes follow the direction that we anticipated. Members of the politically less embedded SMO (Greenpeace) who did not receive information through an organization were indeed less angry than those who did receive information through an organization. Members of the politically more embedded SMO (Natuurpunt) who did not receive information through an organization were angrier than those who did receive information through an organization. The latter could indicate that communication by politically more embedded SMOs has a soothing effect.

FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

In the Netherlands, we also observe that the slopes follow the direction that we anticipated. The pattern is the same, even though members of Greenpeace who did not hear about the demonstration through an organization scored on average ‘lower’ on anger than members of Natuurpunt who did not hear about the demonstration through an organization.
Selection into Treatment?

Following insights from counterfactual analysis (Morgan & Winship 2007), we finally examined whether individuals who received information through an organization possess some property that increased the likelihood that they would receive information through an organization, i.e. that they would self-select into treatment. If such a property exists, then it would be variation across participants on this property that would really be the source of variation on the outcome variable (self-reported level of anger): reception of information would merely be a mediating variable.

We hypothesized that ‘identification with an organization’ could be such a property. If people who identify more strongly with their organization would indeed be more likely to receive information from their organization, then identification with an organization would ultimately explain the variation that we observe in Figures 2 and 3; respondents who identify more with their organization would be the ones who are angrier (cf. Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans and Van Dijk 2011).

FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE

Figure 4 shows that most respondents scored “quite” or “very much” on the question around identification with one of the organizing SMOs. More importantly, we do not find a correlation between (1) the level of identification with one of the organizing SMOs, and (2) whether or not a respondent had heard about the demonstration through an
organization. Thus, it seems that identification as such did not generate more or less receptiveness to communication from SMOs.

**DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION**

In this paper, we investigated how variation in political embeddedness of SMOs affects the self-reported level of anger of SMO members. We hypothesized that members of politically more embedded SMOs would be less angry as compared to members of politically less embedded SMOs. In order to test this hypothesis, we compared the self-reported level of anger among members of a politically more embedded SMO and members of a politically less embedded SMO, both in a routinized a non-routinized demonstration. Using survey data from street demonstrations on climate change in the Netherlands and Belgium, we learned that members of politically less embedded SMOs are on average angrier as compared to members of politically more embedded SMOs.

Having found support for our main hypothesis, we furthermore investigated the causal mechanism underlying the correlation between anger and SMO membership. We speculated that the correlation was an effect of variation in emotion management by SMO leaders. We suggested that leaders of politically less embedded SMOs appeal to feelings of anger of their members, while leaders of politically more embedded SMOs do not.
In order to determine whether leaders of politically more/less embedded SMOs indeed appeal differently to feelings of anger of their members, we compared frames of selected SMOs. We learned that politically less embedded SMOs emit more radical or confrontational frames than politically more embedded SMOs. These more radical or confrontational frames directly or indirectly resonate more with feelings of anger.

Our observation around variation in frames confirmed the assumed emotion management mechanism. As we felt that this support was still thin we carried out a further test of the presumed emotion management mechanism. We used the insight that frames from SMOs can only produce an effect if they actually reach their members. Thus, we compared SMO members who received information about the demonstration from an organization with SMO members who did not receive such information from an organization. In our analyses we distinguished between members of politically more embedded SMOs and members of politically less embedded SMOs. This distinction allowed us to conclude that leaders of politically less embedded SMOs indeed appeal to feelings of anger of their members, while leaders of politically more embedded SMOs do not appeal to – and possibly even suppress – feelings of anger of their members.

With only 141 effective respondents, we used a small sample for our study. The fact that we nonetheless found statistically significant results underscores the strength of the empirical evidence underlying our theory.

Our findings on emotion management have important implications for SMO organizers. They suggest that emotion management works. The literature has demonstrated that emotion management occurs within social movement organizations
(e.g. Goodwin and Pfaff 2001; Schrock et al. 2004). But the literature never systematically showed if emotion management generates effects among targets of such management, i.e. among SMO members. We present evidence that it does.

The main aim of this paper was to test our emotion management hypothesis. Emotion management is not uncommon among social movement organizers (e.g. Goodwin and Pfaff 2001; Gould 2009; Schrock et al. 2004). And yet, comparatively little systematic research on emotion management has been done. Scholars have documented various instances of emotion work (Ibid). But few scholars have examined (1) what causes SMO organizers who engage in emotion management to appeal to different types of emotions, and (2) how particular frames trigger different emotional responses. These questions connect two core research areas: framing and emotions. The connection between these research areas is important but neglected territory in social movements research.

In this paper, we have implicitly concentrated on emotion management in the context of protest. However, emotion management by SMO organizers also occurs in other contexts such as petitioning, raising awareness for particular issues, or lobbying. We imagine that different types and targets of movement activity trigger or ask for different forms of emotion management. Given the importance of emotions for SM activity and success, we suggest investigations of this variation in forms of emotion management.

Emotions permeate protest at all stages: recruitment, sustained participation and dropping out (Jasper 1998). However, the literature focuses mainly on the motivating
power of emotions to enter the movement or to participate in protest. We suggest investigating emotion management at different moments during a movements career. Movements tend to go through an ebb and flow of movement activity. It is expected that organizers have to appeal to different emotions from one stage to another. Moral indignation, for instance, may spur entering a social movement, whereas solidarity or hope might be the emotional glue to stay in a movement, and, feelings of disappointment, frustration or regret might make people decide to quit.

Social movement organizations work hard to design collective action frames that touch upon already existing concerns among potential participants, thereby strengthening their concerns and instigating action tendencies. This process is referred to as frame alignment (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford 1986). Whether frame alignment is done successfully can be concluded from the degree in which a frame actually resonates with pre-existing belief systems and symbolism and evokes shared emotions thereby gaining significance among the audience (Cadena-Roa 2002; Snow and Benford 1988). Snow and Benford speak of frame resonance when there is cognitive alignment between a movement’s ideology and the beliefs of an adherent (Snow and Benford 1988). But there is more to frame alignment: frames are “value-loaded”, and supposedly evoke emotions (Gamson 1992) as frames generally work only when they have an emotional impact on people (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2000). Research of emotional appeals made by SMOs is scarce, and worthy of further analysis.

Scholars who have examined the relation between framing and emotions introduced the term emotional resonance. This term refers to the emotional alignment
between a movement’s ideology and the emotional lives of a potential recruit (Robnett 2004; Schrock et al. 2004). Emotional resonance may result from a top-down and a bottom-up process. Emotion management is a top-down process. However, any correlation between political embeddedness of an SMO and anger of SMO members also involves a bottom-up component (e.g. Lange 1990). That bottom-up component can take two forms. First, individuals who are angrier may have a tendency to join or stay with SMOs that are politically less embedded and often more radical. Second, individuals who are angrier (with politicians) may stimulate their SMO leaders to remain aloof from politics, while individuals who are less angry (with politicians) may stimulate their SMO leaders to engage in dialogue and establish ties to the political establishment.

We did not test for a bottom-up mechanism. Such a test requires time-series data, including information on the level of anger of individual SMO members (1) before and after they joined their respective organizations, and (2) before and after changes in organizational frames or signals. When we find, for instance, that the individual level of anger is similar before and after joining, we have reason to believe that individuals have a tendency to join organizations with particular ideological, emotional or motivational profiles. When we find that organizational frames and signals change after changes in individual levels of anger, we have reason to believe that SMO members affect organizational politics. We did not collect time-series data for our project. We hold that the collection of time-series data, and the study of a bottom-up mechanism, would nonetheless be very valuable to future research on emotion work in social movements.
Beyond studies of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms, we suggest that future research tackles the interaction between the two. We imagine that the bottom-up mechanism and the top-down mechanism are in a dialogue with one another. We think that the emotional state of individual SMO members at any point in time is the outcome of a process by which pre-existing emotional orientations of SMO members interact with collective action frames disseminated by SMO leaders, vibrating towards an equilibrium in which there is “emotional resonance”.

Movement organizers may evoke different emotions while informing or appealing to their members. Anger is only one among different emotions. We decided to focus on anger as our dependent variable because of the theoretical relevance of anger in mobilization processes. But we predict that other emotions may be equally, if not more, important for mobilization. Accordingly, we finally advocate systematic investigation of emotion management in the context of various types of emotions, their inter-relations, and their connections to beliefs and motivations (see also Troost, Klandermans and Stekelenburg 2011). We think that such research will bring us closest to the reality of mobilization and protest, and thus generate the most fruitful insights on the relation between emotions and social movements.
By a demonstration, we mean “a collective gathering in a public space whose aim is to exert political, social, and/or cultural influence on authorities, public opinion and participants through the disciplined and peaceful expression of an opinion or demand.” (Casquete 2006: 47)

“Professional managers are paid staff who make careers out of movement work” (Staggenborg 1988, p. 586)

We shall discuss an alternative logic in the discussion section at the end of the paper. This alternative logic involves a bottom-up mechanism by which (a) individuals who are comparatively angry tend to join or stay with SMOs that are politically less embedded, or (b) individuals who are comparatively angry affect the incentive of SMO leaders to establish ties to the political establishment and become politically more or less embedded.

Although in theory people could take part in both demonstrations – the distance between Brussels and Belgium is about 1.5 hours by train – we found no overlap in our samples.

Interview representative Union Better Living (BBL), Brussels, February 18, 2011.

Ibid.

Ibid.

See http://www.globalclimatecampaign.org. The Global Climate Campaign publishes online reports from climate change demonstrations across the world.

See http://www.stichtingmilieunet.nl. Stichting Milieunet is a Dutch non-for-profit organization that concentrates on disseminating information about the environment and climate change.

Natagara is the Walloon counterpart of the Flemish organization Natuurpunt.

Interview representative Greenpeace, Brussels, March 2, 2011; Interview representative Union Better Living (BBL), Brussels, February 18, 2011.

Interview representative Natuurpunt, Brussels, March 4, 2011.

We ran all of our analysis with and without members of both SMOs. We found that the average level of anger of these individuals fell in between the average level of anger of individuals who reported ‘membership of Greenpeace but not of Natuurpunt’ versus the average level of anger of individuals who reported ‘membership of Natuurpunt but not of Greenpeace’. This finding supports our hypothesis. We nonetheless decided to exclude respondents who reported dual membership for the following reasons. First, we found it hard to develop unambiguous hypotheses for this group. Second, a pure focus on extreme or ideal cases fits the logic of “theory testing case studies”, i.e. the logic that we adopted in our research design.

The following are numbers of respondents and standard deviations for the four groups. Greenpeace Belgium: N= 57, SD= 1.10; Greenpeace Netherlands: N= 44, SD= 1.12; Natuurpunt Belgium: N= 26, SD= 1.08; Natuurpunt Netherlands (Natuurmonumenten): N= 14, SD= 0.94.

“An organization” can be any organization. It could be a non-environmental SMO or an environmental SMO other than Greenpeace, Natuurpunt, Natagara and Natuurmonumenten. In our sample – only respondents who indicated membership of either Greenpeace or Natuurpunt – we observed that 64 percent indicated membership of Greenpeace or Natuurpunt only, i.e. these respondents were not members of any of the other organizing SMOs. When testing the emotion management mechanism, we accounted for the fact that 36 percent of our respondents were also members of other organizations – and could thus have learned about the demonstration through other organizations or co-members of other organizations – by including a dummy variable for ‘organizational exclusivity’. Respondents who indicated membership of Greenpeace or Natuurpunt only would receive a score of 0, and respondents who indicated membership of more organizations would receive a score of 1. In our analyses, we did not find a statistically or substantively significant effect for this dummy ‘organizational exclusivity’.
We changed the order of the statements – Greenpeace statement first versus Natuurpunt statement first – across issues and questionnaires so as to control for order effects.

The following are numbers of respondents and standard deviations for the four groups in Belgium. Greenpeace members who did not receive information through an organization: N=15; SD= 1.28; Greenpeace members who received information through an organization: N=42; SD= 1.05; Natuurpunt members who did not receive information through an organization: N= 10; SD= 0.94; Natuurpunt members who received information through an organization: N=16; SD= 1.15.

The following are numbers of respondents and standard deviations for the four groups in the Netherlands. Greenpeace members who did not receive information through an organization: N=13; SD= 0.95; Greenpeace members who received information through an organization: N=31; SD= 1.18; Natuurpunt members who did not receive information through an organization: N= 5; SD= 1.34; Natuurpunt members who received information through an organization: N=9; SD= 0.74.

We asked: “To what extent do you identify with one of the organizations that organizes this demonstration/manifestation?” Respondents could score on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 meant ‘not at all’ and 5 meant ‘very’.

Following Schrock et al., we define emotional resonance as “the emotional harmony and/or disjuncture between collective action frames and the emotional lives of potential recruits” (2004, p. 61; see also Robnett 2004)
REFERENCES


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Green votes</th>
<th>Green parliamentary seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2002</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2006</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
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</table>

Table 1. Belgium Votes and Parliamentary Seats (percentages)
Table 2. Netherlands Votes and Parliamentary Seats (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Green votes</th>
<th>Green parliamentary seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2005</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members Politically Less Embedded SMO</td>
<td>Members of Greenpeace (Belgium)</td>
<td>Members of Greenpeace (Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Routinized and More Confrontational Demonstration</td>
<td>More Routinized and Less Confrontational Demonstration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members Politically More Embedded SMO</td>
<td>Members of Natuurpunt/Natagora (Belgium)</td>
<td>Members of Natuurmonumenten (Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Routinized and Less Confrontational Demonstration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Case Selection
Table 4. Frequency table with absolute numbers of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Demonstration Belgium</th>
<th>Demonstration Netherlands</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greenpeace</td>
<td><strong>60 (57)</strong></td>
<td><strong>53 (44)</strong></td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natuurpunt</td>
<td><strong>30 (26)</strong></td>
<td><strong>17 (14)</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natuurpunt &amp; Greenpeace</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>334</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>604</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: bold figures in brackets reflect absolute numbers of respondents in the respective categories after controlling for missing values on variables included in subsequent statistical analyses.
Table 5. Ordered Logistic Regression Coefficients on Self-Identified Level of Anger

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Baseline Model</th>
<th>Emotion Management Mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \hat{b} )</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMO Political Embeddedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 = Less Embedded (Greenpeace)</td>
<td>-0.769</td>
<td>(0.35)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = More Embedded (Natuurpunt)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reception Information Through SMO</td>
<td>0 = Not Received Information through SMO</td>
<td>0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = Received Information through SMO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction SMO PE and Information Through SMO</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 = Belgium</td>
<td>-0.974</td>
<td>(0.33)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Country SMO PE</td>
<td>0.648</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Squared</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edu</td>
<td>2.058</td>
<td>(1.08)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edu Squared</td>
<td>-0.177</td>
<td>(0.09)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 = Female</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = Male</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>(0.09)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>141</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-186.721</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>( \chi^2 ) for Likelihood Ratio Test</td>
<td>21.46</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Df</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.0543</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01
Note: authors apply one-tailed tests
Figure 1. Self-identified Level of Anger among the Four Groups
Figure 2. Self-identified level of anger in *Belgium* (mean scores)

![Graph showing self-identified level of anger in Belgium](image)

- **Members of Politically Less Embedded SMO (Greenpeace)**
- **Members of Politically More Embedded SMO (Natuurpunt)**
Figure 3. Self-identified level of anger in the Netherlands (mean scores)
Figure 4. Self-identified level of identification with organizations (all four SMOs)